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Abstract
This paper investigates the changing relationship between employment and real output
in the U.S. economy from 1948 to 2010 both at the aggregate level and at some major
industry-grouping levels of disaggregation. Real output is conventionally measured as
value added corrected for price inflation, but there are some industries in which no
independent measure of value added is possible and existing statistics depend on im-
puting value added to equal income. Indexes of output that exclude these imputations
are closely correlated with employment over the whole period, and remain more closely
correlated during the current business cycle. This analysis offers insights into deeper
structural changes that have taken place in the U.S. economy over the past few decades
in a context marked by the following three factors: (i) the service (especially the finan-
cial) sector has grown in importance, (ii) the economy has become more globalized,
and (iii) the policy orientation has increasingly become neoliberal. We demonstrate
an economically significant reduction in the coefficient relating employment growth
to output growth over the business cycles since 1985. Some of this change is due to
sectoral shifts toward services, but an important part of it reflects a reduction in the
coefficient for the goods and material value-adding sectors.
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1 Introduction
One of the many remarkable challenges to received economic ideas posed by the financial and
economic crisis that hit the capitalist world in 2007 is the fact that widely accepted models
of output-employment dynamics badly missed the mark in predicting the shape of the down-
turn and recovery. The two U.S. business cycles preceding the 2007 crisis produced“jobless
recoveries”, in which employment rose much more slowly relative to measures of output such
as real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than models predicted. The 2007 − 8 crisis added
another dimension to this anomaly in seeming to be an “output-less crash”. In 2009, the
official unemployment rate in the U.S. rose about twice what would have been predicted by
conventional models of output-employment dynamics, given measured declines in output;
another way of stating the same phenomenon is that in the downturn of 2009, the fall in
GDP was far lower than what would have been predicted by conventional models given the
increase in the aggregate unemployment rate. The increase in real GDP since the official
end of the Great Recession in second quarter of 2009 had even less impact on the aggregate
unemployment rate than in the previous two jobless recoveries.
As we document in this paper, the close relationship between output growth as measured
by real GDP and employment generation that characterized the U.S. economy over the
two decades after World War II has been weakening since the mid 1980s. This has led
both to “jobless recoveries” in which aggregate unemployment has decreased less during the
upturn phase of business cycles than what would have been predicted on the basis of the
past association between output growth and unemployment changes, and also to “output-
less crashes” in which the aggregate unemployment rate has increased by more during the
downturn phase of the business cycle than past experience would have predicted. Thus, what
seems to be at issue is a changing relationship between aggregate demand as measured by
real GDP and employment over the whole business cycle.
The political economic implications of this change are far-reaching in both a short- and
long-run perspective. As an immediate political issue, persistently high unemployment rates,
in the face of modest real GDP growth and high profits, had an enormous effect on the 2010
mid-term elections in the U.S.1 From a longer term labor perspective, the weakening of the
relationship between measured real GDP growth and employment poses serious questions
about the viability of globalizing growth strategies for economic development in the U.S.
economy and around the world. Understanding these developments will be a necessary first
step in fashioning alternatives to neoliberal economic policies that can generate growth in
employment and protect labor interests such as the right to collective bargaining, adequate
wages and benefits, acceptable working conditions, adequate and secure pensions, and demo-
cratic political institutions.2
What lies behind the changing relationship between real output and employment in the
1http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/mystery-for-white-house-where-did-the-jobs-go/
?emc=eta1
2Even as the unemployment rate remains stuck above 9%, corporate profits have been re-
ported to have increased at record rates: http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/12/
a-high-water-mark-for-profits/
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U.S. and other advanced capitalist economies? This paper investigates this question in
several steps. First, we document the relationship between the rapid growth of tertiary
“service” industries and changes in employment-output dynamics. We provide evidence that
the discrepancy between predictions based on historical experience and actual changes has
been growing, not only in the 2007−2009 recession but also over the previous three business
cycles. An important feature of this discrepancy is the growing importance of industries,
such as Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) where measures of output are imputed
in the NIPA accounts on the basis of incomes. A Measurable Value Added (MVA) index of
output that excludes these industries is more closely related to changes in employment over
recent business cycles than is real GDP. While MVA has a high overall correlation with real
GDP over much of the post-WWII period, there is evidence that this correlation is weaker
at business cycle frequencies, and has been falling over recent business cycles. Thus one
explanation for jobless recoveries and output-less crashes is that the most widely used index
of real output, real GDP, is drifting further and further from reporting changes in aggregate
demand that lead to changes in employment.
We also examine the evolution of the relation between employment and output in indus-
tries where there are independent measures of value-added output and income. We find that
the elasticity of employment with respect to output in these industries has been falling over
recent business cycles. Thus in addition to the fact that real GDP does an increasingly bad
job of measuring aggregate demand, there appears to be a weakening link between aggregate
demand and employment in the U.S. economy.
We evaluate one theory that has been advanced in the literature to explain the phe-
nomenon of jobless recoveries, increasing “flexibilization” of labor markets, and find it not
well-supported by the evidence. Finally, we offer some alternative hypotheses regarding the
changing relationship between real output and employment in the U.S. economy as a way of
understanding deeper processes of structural change taking place in the U.S. economy and
its relation to the world economy under the neoliberal regime of financial globalization.
We find that the service industries tend to have a lower responsiveness of employment to
output than non-service industries, in part because output is hard to measure in some service
industries and incomes in service industries such as FIRE are weakly related to aggregate
demand. As a result we would expect the economy-wide responsiveness of employment to
output to fall as services grow as a fraction of GDP. But we also find strong evidence that
there has been a significant decline in the sectoral responsiveness of employment to output
in goods and more generally value-adding sectors of the economy, which points to a change
in the structure of U.S. production. We associate this change with the restructuring of the
U.S. economy due to globalization of production.
2 Okun’s Law and the Kaldor-Verdoorn Effect
There are two different theoretical traditions that can be used to study the relationship
between output or aggregate demand and employment, a mainstream tradition that starts
with the work of Arthur Okun (1962), and a heterodox tradition that begins with Verdoorn
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(1949); this latter tradition was revived by Kaldor (1966) and has, since then, generated a
substantial heterodox body of work.
2.1 Okun’s Law
The traditional mainstream starting point for analyses of the employment-output link is
“Okun’s Law”. Okun (1962) drew attention to a stable and statistically significant negative
relationship between economy-wide unemployment rate changes and growth rates of real
GDP in the U.S. economy (Knottek, 2007; Delong, 2009; Daly and Hobijn, 2010; IMF, 2010;
Gordon, 2010). Okun offered two versions of the relationship: (a) a negative relationship
between quarterly changes in the unemployment rate and the growth rate of real GDP, and
(b) a negative relationship between the output gap (deviation of real GDP from “potential”
output) and the unemployment gap (deviation of the unemployment rate from some bench-
mark value). The first version has been called, in the subsequent literature, the “difference”
version of Okun’s Law, and both a static and a dynamic specification of this version has been
widely studied. The second version has been called the “gap” version of Okun’s Law; its
popularity seems to have diminished because estimates of the output gap require estimates
of variables like potential output or a benchmark unemployment rate like the NAIRU which
are not directly observable.
The static difference version of Okun’s Law, in which an intuitive interpretation of the
coefficients is easiest to explain, is written as
∆ut = a+ bg
Y
t + εt, (1)
where ut refers to the aggregate unemployment rate, and g
Y
t refers to the rate of growth of
real GDP. The coefficients, a and b, in this equation have direct intuitive interpretations. To
see this, let us focus on the regression function:
∆ut = ut − ut−1 = a+ bgYt = b(gYt +
a
b
). (2)
Thus, −(a/b) represents the growth rate of real output that keeps the unemployment rate
constant. But a constant unemployment rate implies that the volume of employment is
growing at the same rate as the labour force. This can be ensured, in turn, if the growth
of real output is the sum of the growth rate of the labour force and the growth rate of
productivity (real output per worker). Thus, −(a/b) provides an estimate of the sum of the
growth rate of the labour force and the growth rate of productivity, often regarded as the
“natural” growth rate of the economy.
What is the interpretation of b? From the regression function we see that if gYt =
1 − (a/b), then ut − ut−1 = b, which suggests the following interpretation for b: for every
percentage point increase in the growth rate of real output above the natural growth rate,
the unemployment rate falls by b percentage points.
The dynamic difference specification of the Okun’s Law extends the static version by
including lags of the independent and dependent variable:
∆ut = a+ b1g
Y
t + b2g
Y
t−1 + b3g
Y
t−2 + b4∆ut−1 + b5∆ut−2 + εt. (3)
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While the dynamic version is better for forecasting, the coefficient b1 loses its simple and
intuitive interpretation. In the dynamic version the Okun coefficient, b1, captures the partial
effect of contemporaneous output growth on the change in the unemployment rate.3
At the time of Okun’s original study, available data indicated that growth in the output
of the economy as a whole of about three percent would reduce unemployment (or neglecting
labor force participation changes, increase employment) by one percent. Over time estimates
of b1 were revised to about one-half, implying that overall economic growth of two percent
would increase employment by one percent. In this context “output” is measured as real value
added (with small corrections, Real Gross Domestic Product), which in turn is estimated by
deflating sectoral or economy-wide Gross Domestic Product by an appropriate price index.
We depart from this widely used methodology of studying economy-wide Okun’s Law
type of relationships in two ways. First, we carry out the analysis at a more disaggregated
level of industries and industry groupings. Second, we frame our study as investigating
the relationship between employment growth and output growth rather than between the
unemployment rate and output growth. The second point is related to the first since, in the
presence of inter-industry labor mobility, it is not possible to meaningfully define industry-
level unemployment rates.
2.2 Verdoorn’s Law
The relationship between employment growth and output growth also plays a central role
in heterodox macroeconomics, where it is usually called the “Kaldor-Verdoorn Effect”.
Verdoorn (1949) noticed, in studying statistics describing the recovery of the European
economies after WWII, that sectoral employment growth tended systematically to fall short
of measured sectoral output growth. Nicholas Kaldor (1966, 1967, 1975) elevated this rela-
tionship to a central place in his demand-driven models of economic growth, in contrast to
the neoclassical production function. The Kaldor-Verdoorn effect also plays an important
role in post-Keynesian thinking about the impact of demand-driven economic growth on
labor productivity change.
The empirical regularity noted by Verdoorn (1949) – that employment growth tended
systematically to fall short of measured output growth for a number of capitalist economies
recovering from WWII – was provided a theoretical underpinning by Kaldor (1966, 1967)
3The gap version of Okun’s law, which we will not pursue in this paper, relates to the relationship between
the output gap and the deviation of the aggregate unemployment rate from some benchmark value (the
unemployment gap). A popular form of the gap version uses the NAIRU as the benchmark unemployment
rate and is, thus, written as
(ut − u∗t ) = c+ d(Yt − Y ∗t ) + εt,
where u∗t stands for the NAIRU, Yt is real GDP and Y
∗
t is potential output. The coefficient of interest, in
this case, is d, the partial effect of the output gap on the unemployment gap: if the output gap changes
by 1 percentage point, the unemployment gap changes by d percentage points. Probably because this
version requires the estimation of quantities like the potential output and the NAIRU, which are not directly
observable, it is less popular among researchers.
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using the idea of increasing returns to scale. Classical economists since Adam Smith have
emphasized the presence of static and dynamic economies of scale (or increasing returns) in
manufacturing activities – which we can now generalize to all industrial activities – as being
the most important engine of aggregate economic growth. What is the logic underlying this
claim? A greater extent of the market, i.e., stable and growing sources of demand for indus-
trial products, spurs a greater division of labor leading both to greater specialization and a
higher differentiation of production; both of these cause higher productivity by generating
greater skill and know-how leading, in turn, to product and process innovation. A charac-
teristic of this classical logic of increasing returns, as emphasized by Young (1928), is that it
operates at the aggregate and not firm level; it is a “macro-phenomenon” because much of
the economies of scale result from increased differentiation that results in the emergence of
“new processes and new subsidiary industries”. Hence, testing for the presence of economies
of scale at the level of the firm, as has often been done by economists of neoclassical per-
suasion, is an improper way to assess the strength of the classical logic of increasing returns.
Kaldor (1966, 1967) provided an alternative, and theoretically more sound, method to test
the presence of aggregate scale economies.
Kaldor interpreted Verdoorn’s Law, in light of the classical logic of increasing returns, as
an assertion about a positive relationship between output growth and productivity growth,
with the causality running from the former to the latter due to the presence of static and
dynamic economies of scale. It is important to note that Verdoorn’s Law relates to a dy-
namic rather than a static relationship, a relationship between growth rates of output and
productivity rather than between their levels. Why is this so? This is primarily because
technological progress arising from “learning by doing” (Arrow, 1962) underlies Verdoorn’s
Law, as we have indicated above; it is “not just a reflection of the economies of large-scale
production.” (Kaldor, 1966). Since productivity, or real output per capita, is a measure of
what economists call the “standard of living”, Kaldor’s rendition of Verdoorn’s Law can be
immediately seen as leading to a theory of demand-led economic growth. Thus, the rate of
growth of output (standing as a proxy for aggregate demand or the extent of the market)
becomes the factor limiting the rate of growth of productivity (standard of living) in sharp
contrast to the neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956; 1957) with resource constraints (e.g.,
labor and capital) as limiting factors.
A demand-constrained vision of economic growth such as is implied by Verdoorn’s Law
has a straightforward testable implication: a regression of productivity growth (dependent
variable) on output growth (independent variable) should throw up a coefficient (on out-
put growth) that is statistically significantly positive but less than unity. The coefficient
on output growth should be positive to capture the positive impact of demand growth on
productivity growth; and it should be less than unity to emphasize the fact that productivity
growth is limited by the growth of demand. Such an empirical relationship between output
growth and productivity growth, in turn, implies a positive relationship between output
growth and employment growth of a similar nature. Since productivity growth increases
less than one-for-one with output growth, it must be the case that the latter is positively
correlated with employment growth with the partial effect of output growth on employment
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growth less than unity.
We could have approached the matter from the other end too. Presence of static and
dynamic scale economies imply that output growth will be in excess of employment growth.
This immediately implies, since productivity growth is the difference of output growth and
employment growth, that output growth must be positively correlated with productivity
growth. By either route, we come to understand Kaldor’s statement that Verdoorn’s Law
“asserts that with a higher rate of growth of output, both productivity and employment
increase at a faster rate, the regression coefficients with respect to each being of the same
order of magnitude.” (Kaldor 1966; 1967).
Thus the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law can be seen as postulating a positive relationship between
the growth rate of output and the growth rate of productivity (defined either as output per
hour or output per worker) in the industrial sector of an economy, with special emphasis on
the manufacturing industries. If gYt represents the growth rate of output, g
y
t represents the
growth rate of productivity then the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law can be stated as
gyt = −α + (1− β)gYt + εt. (4)
Since the rate of growth of productivity is the difference between the rate of growth of output
and the rate of growth of employment, the same relationship could also be stated as
gEt = α + βg
Y
t + εt, (5)
where gEt represents the growth rate of labour (either hours of work or number of workers).
The most important coefficient in the Kaldor-Verdoorn regression is β (often called the
Verdoorn coefficient or the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect), which gives the partial effect of output
growth on employment growth: if the rate of growth of output increases by 1 percentage
point, the rate of growth of employment increases by β percentage points.4 Note that the
reciprocal of (1− β) gives the degree of returns to scale: if (1− β) is significantly less than
unity so that 1/(1 − β) is significantly greater than unity, this provides evidence in favour
of increasing returns to scale.
Following the celebrated debate between Rowthorn (1975a, 1975b) and Kaldor (1975),
the growth rate of capital per worker, gkt , is also included as a regressor to control for the
effect of capital accumulation; this modified version of the Verdoorn Law, which Michl (1985)
termed the augmented technical progress function, emerges as:
gyt = −α + (1− β)gYt + γgkt + εt.
Since the rate of growth of productivity is the difference between the rate of growth of output
and the rate of growth of employment, the same relationship could also be stated as
gEt = α + βg
Y
t + γg
k
t + εt,
4Note that we depart a little from convention by calling β the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect; it is probably more
common to call (1 − β) the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect. We stick to this alternative terminology because our
analysis focuses on the link between employment and output growth.
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where gEt represents the growth rate of labour (either hours of work or number of workers).
The interpretation of the crucial parameter, β, remains the same as in the case without the
growth rate of the capital-labour ratio: if (1 − β) is significantly less than unity so that
1/(1 − β) is significantly greater than unity, this provides evidence in favour of increasing
returns to scale.
While the effects of scale economies express themselves as a macro-phenomenon, as
Kaldor had pointed out following Young (1928), he also insisted that there was an im-
portant sectoral dimension to keep in mind. The “phenomenon” of increasing returns that
underlies Verdoorn’s Law, according to Kaldor, is “particularly associated with so-called
“secondary” activities – with industrial production, including public utilities, construction,
as well as manufacturing – rather than the primary or tertiary sectors of the economy.”
(Kaldor, 1966). Why is this so?
The primary sector – agriculture and mining – can be expected to display the operation
of diminishing returns due to the presence of a fixed input to production (e.g., land), as
the classical economists had stressed; hence, the primary sector would not display strong
Verdoorn effects since increasing returns to scale do not operate in such production activities.
In the tertiary sector, which includes activities like transportation, wholesale and retail trade,
banking and financial services, professional services, etc., on the other hand, increasing
returns to scale are either not very strong or their effects, when present, peter out relatively
fast. “Over much of this field [i.e., services], learning by experience must clearly play a role
but economies of scale are nearly not so prominent and are exhausted more quickly.” Why?
Throughout a considerable part of this sector “productivity” is a meaningless
notion, since “output” cannot be measured independently of “input”. In areas,
such as hairdressing, catering, or laundries, where output could, in principle, be
measured independently, economies of scale, internal or external, are not likely
to play an important role. In yet other fields, such as distribution, the growth of
total output is merely a reflection of the rate of growth of commodity production.
The rate of increase of productivity, provided that excess capacity exists, will in
this case vary in automatic response to the rate of growth of production in the
primary and secondary sectors, and the consequent growth in consumption. It
is just as easy to sell two packages of cigarettes to a customer in a shop as
one package. This is not meant, of course, to deny that large-scale methods of
distribution are superior to small-scale methods, or to minimize the importance
of labor-saving innovations, for example, the supermarkets. But the productivity
growth resulting from such changes in techniques is not dependent on the rate
of growth of aggregate demand: the productivity growth could equally well take
place irrespective of whether the total turnover of the distributive sector rise fast
or slowly. (Kaldor, 1967, pp. 21-22)
Using a sample of 12 advanced capitalist countries, Kaldor (1966) found strong evidence
in support of Verdoorn’s Law for the period 1953-54 to 1963-64. Not only did he find evidence
of the Verdoorn Law for industrial activities, he also found that the primary and tertiary
sectors either displayed a weak or a non-existent effect.
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A criticism that has often been made against Kaldor’s rendition of Verdoorn’s Law, as for
instance captured in (4), is the problem of possible endogeneity of output growth (Rowthorn,
1975b; Skott, 1999). If there is an impact of productivity growth on output growth, as might
be expected by Kaldor’s own argument about cumulative causation and economic growth,
then the OLS estimator of β in (4) would be inconsistent and arguments based on such
estimates, as for instance in Kaldor (1967), would be incorrect.
There are straightforward ways to deal with this criticism. From an econometric per-
spective, the problem of endogeneity can be tackled either by using a simultaneous equations
approach, as was attempted in Parikh (1978), or by using instrumental variables estimation
instead of ordinary least squares. The fact that the estimates in Parikh (1978) are still close
to the original estimates of Verdoorn (1949) or Kaldor (1966) suggests, as pointed out by
Michl (1985), that the endogeneity problem might not be very acute; hence, OLS estimates
can be used as a first approximation of the “true” Verdoorn coefficient. From a theoretical
perspective, exogeneity of the rate of output growth does not stand in conflict with Kaldor’s
cumulative causation argument. The cumulative causation argument can equally well rest
on the basis of an effect of the level of output on productivity without in any way implying a
causal impact of the rate of growth of output on productivity growth. Hence, the theoretical
criticisms in Rowthorn (1975b) and Skott (1999) might not be all that damaging.
3 Sectoral and Aggregate Growth
We begin our analysis by documenting two key features of the structural changes that have
taken place in the post-War U.S. economy: changing distribution of real output and employ-
ment across broad sectors and industries. To do so we use the Annual Industry Accounts of
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) that provides consistent annual data for gross
value added and employment at the industry level harmonised across time according to the
2002 NAICS codes.5
3.1 Sectoral Shares
Figure 1 can be used to understand the changing distribution of output and employment
across the various sectors and industries of the U.S. economy. The first row of Figure 1
provides information about three broad divisions of the U.S. economy: the private goods-
producing industries, the private services-producing industries and the private industries
involved in measuable value-addition.
Private goods-producing industries are composed of the following industries: agriculture,
forestry, fishing, and hunting; mining; construction; and manufacturing. Private services-
producing industries, on the other hand, comprise the following industries: utilities; whole-
sale trade; retail trade; transportation and warehousing; information (publishing, motion
picture and sound recording, broadcasting, information and data processing); finance and
insurance; real estate and rental and leasing; professional, scientific and technical services;
5Details about this and other data sets used in the paper are collected together in the appendix.
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management of companies and enterprises; administrative and waste management services;
educational services; health care and social assistance; arts, entertainment, and recreation;
accommodation and food services; and other services, except government.
The distinction between goods-producing and services-producing industries is useful for
certain purposes, but it is conceptually unsatisfactory from a Marxian or classical polit-
ical economy perspective that distinguishes productive and unproductive labor. Some of
the service industries such as wholesale and retail trade, realize the final value of produced
commodities, and it is more consistent to regard their value added as part of commodity
production. Service industries, such as utilities and transportation and warehousing trans-
form the use-value of inputs and add value like commodity producing industries. Some other
service sectors such as information services, administrative and waste management services,
and arts, entertainment, accommodation and food services produce a measurable output
without imputations. The classification of industries into goods-producing and services-
producing sectors does not distinguish between value-adding (or productive) sectors and
value-realizing (or unproductive) sectors. Hence we have constructed a category of indus-
tries which produce an independently measurable value-added, which we term Measurable
Value Added (MVA). This “value-adding sector” is composed of sectors where a tangible
output (good or service) is sold in the market for a price and hence the value added figure is
measurable without imputations. The MVA category is composed of the following industries
from the AIA: agriculture; mining; utilities; construction; manufacturing; wholesale trade;
retail trade; transportation and warehousing; information services; adminstrative and waste
management; art, entertainment, accommodation and food services.
The first row of Figure 1 shows the transformation of the U.S. economy into a “service
economy”: the share of the goods-producing industries, both in terms of value added and
employment, has witnessed a secular decline.
The second row of Figure 1 takes a look at the U.S. economy at a more disaggregated level
and comes up with several interesting trends.6 First, the manufacturing sector has witnessed
a spectacular decline in terms of both value added and employment; while the manufacturing
sector was the largest component of the U.S. economy in the early 1950s, both in terms of
value added and employment, it has been overtaken by key service-producing industries in
both respects. By the mid-1980s the finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector had
overtaken manufacturing as contributing the largest share of GDP; by the mid-2000s, the
professional and business services (PBS) sector had similarly overtaken the manufacturing
sector. In terms of the share of total employment, the same process was delayed by about two
decades: only in the late 1990s did the PBS sector employ more workers than manufacturing.
Second, the FIRE sector has increased its share of value added much more steadily than
its share of total employment. In fact, the share of employment accounted for by the FIRE
6We use the following industry-level abbreviations: ALL: the whole economy; PVT: the private industries;
PGD: private goods-producing industries; PSV: private services-producing industries; MVA: the value-adding
industries; CNS: construction; MFG: manufacturing; WTD: wholesale trade; RTD: retail trade; TWR:
transportation and warehousing; INF: information; FIR: finance, insurance and real estate; PBS: professional
and business services; EHS: education and health services; ART: art, entertainment, accommodation and
food services; OTH: other services.
10
sector has stagnated since the mid-1980s, but the share of output contributed by this sector
has continued increasing right till the mid-2000s. A similar, though less pronounced, trend
can be observed in both the PBS and information services (INF) sectors too.
Third, among the goods-producing industries, only construction (CNS) industries has
managed to retain its share, both in terms of value added and employment; in fact, its share
of total employment has witnessed a small increase since the early 1990s.
3.2 Real GDP and Real MVA
MVA is a consistent alternative to GDP for the measurement of the value of gross output.
Under this convention the incomes generated in the service sectors excluded from MVA
would be treated as transfers, without being added to the product side of the accounts as
imputations. The aggregate economy as measured by MVA is smaller than as measured by
GDP due to the exclusion of these imputations. In 2009 MVA was 42% of GDP.
If MVA were a constant proportion of GDP over time, it would not make much difference
which measure we used. But over the post-WWII period, MVA deflated by broad indexes
of prices such as the GDP deflator has been growing more slowly than real GDP. How does
real GDP, compare with real MVA over time? To answer this question, we have tabulated
(average annual compound) growth rates for the whole economy (ALL), the private sector
(PVT), both using real GDP categories, and the value-adding part of the economy (MVA)
for different time periods in Table 1.
Several interesting facts emerge from Table 1. First, the growth rate of real MVA was
considerably lower than the growth rate of real GDP either for the whole economy or the
private sector: between 1948 and 2008, the real GDP for the whole economy grew at an
average rate of 3.34 per cent per annum; the real MVA of the economy grew, for this period,
at only 2.62 per cent per annum. The ratio of the two growth rates was about 0.78. Given
the growing importance of incomes generated in industries such as FIRE, PBS, and EHS
over this period, it is not surprising that the inclusion of these incomes as imputed output
raises the measured growth rate.
Second, the growth rate differential widened during the neoliberal period. Between 1948
and 1973, the so-called Golden Age of capitalism, the growth rate of real MVA was about
82.66 per cent of the growth rate of real GDP; between 1980 and 2008, the neoliberal era,
the growth rate of real MVA was only 72.91 per cent of the growth rate of real GDP. This
implies that the value-transferring (or value-wasting) part of the economy has grown relative
to the value-adding part during the neoliberal era. The picture is even more pronounced if we
restrict ourselves to the private sector of the economy. If, as we will argue, real MVA is more
closely linked both to aggregate demand and output, this growing gap between real MVA
and real GDP is an important factor in the failure of historic patterns of employment-output
dynamics to appear in recent business cycles when output is measured by real GDP.
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Figure 1: Changing Sectoral Distribution of Output and Employment, 1948-2009
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Table 1: Average Annual Compound
Growth Rates
Period ALL PVT MVA
1948-08 3.34 3.31 2.62
1948-1973 3.98 3.81 3.29
1980-2008 2.99 3.02 2.18
1950-59 3.62 3.34 2.66
1960-69 4.65 4.46 4.12
1970-79 3.57 3.81 3.59
1980-89 3.39 3.40 2.27
1990-99 3.32 3.52 3.06
2000-08 2.15 2.06 1.29
4 Employment and Output
4.1 Empirical Model
We now turn to an investigation of the changing relationship between output and employ-
ment, not only at the aggregate level but also at more disaggregated, industry, levels. We
have seen that there are two distinct strands of the literature that can be used to study the
changing relationship between output and employment, the Okun’s Law literature and the
Kaldor-Verdoorn literature. We choose to work within the latter tradition because, to our
mind, it has the following advantages over the Okun’s Law type analysis.
First, Okun’s Law as a theoretical relationship is a reduced form relationship; it does
not have any deeper theoretical underpinning other than the simple idea that producing
output requires the use of labour power. The Kaldor-Verdoorn Law, on the other hand, can
be derived from more primitive theoretical ideas; hence, it can be plausibly understood as a
structural relationship obtaining in capitalist economies and has been used as such within the
heterodox macroeconomics tradition, for instance as a “stylized fact” in the Dixon-Thirlwall
(1975) model.7
Second, Okun’s Law-type analyses establish a relationship between the growth of output
and changes in the aggregate unemployment rate, the relationship being mediated through
changes in the labour force participation rate. Thus, the Okun coefficient, can change if
the labour force participation rate changes with the relationship between output growth and
employment remaining unchanged. The Okun’s Law framework is therefore not suitable
if one is interested in primarily investigating the relationship between output growth and
employment changes. The Kaldor-Verdoorn tradition, on the other hand, by directly focusing
7The Kaldor-Verdoorn relationship can be derived in several ways. For instance, it can be arrived at
by combining Kaldor’s technical progress function with an accelerator type relationship. It can also be
derived by formalizing Allyn Young’s ideas about increasing returns to scale within a neoclassical aggregate
production function framework (McCombie, Pugno and Soro, 2002).
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on the relationship between output growth and employment growth offers precisely such a
framework.
Third, while the Okun’s Law-type analysis is pitched at the aggregate level, the Kaldor-
Verdoorn framework naturally allows for analysis at more disaggregated levels. Since, in the
absence of a sectorally captive labour force, unemployment rates cannot be meaningfully
defined at the industry level Okun’s Law type analysis cannot be naturally extended from
the aggregate to the industry levels.
For these reasons, we use a dynamic version of the Kaldor-Verdoorn regression equation
in (4) to study the changing relationship between output and employment in the post-war
U.S. economy:
gEt = α + βg
Y
t +
n∑
i=1
γig
Y
t−i +
m∑
j=1
δjg
E
t−j + ut, (6)
where gEt stands for growth rate of employment, g
Y
t stands for the growth rate of real output,
ut stands for an error term.
There are two parameters of interest that emerge from the estimation of (6), one which
measures the contemporaneous effect of output growth on employment growth and the other
that captures the long run impact of output growth on employment growth. On the one hand,
the crucial parameter, β in (6), measures the partial effect of output growth on employment
output: β gives the change in the growth rate of employment that will result from a one
percentage point change in the growth rate of real output; we will call this the short run (or
contemporaneous) Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient. On the other hand, the long run impact of
output growth on employment growth can be measured by β∗, where
β∗ =
β +
∑n
i=1 γi(
1−∑mj=1 δj) ; (7)
β∗ gives the change in the growth rate of employment that will result from a one percentage
point change in the growth rate of real output when we allow the effect to completely work
itself out over time, i.e., allowing lagged effects to kick in.8
4.2 Some Specification Issues
The model in (6) is similar in structure to what is referred to in the literature as the dynamic
version of Okun’s Law (Knotek, 2007; IMF, 2010); dynamics is allowed into the model
through two channels: lagged independent variable and lagged dependent variable. The
first specification issue that we wish to discuss is related to the question of whether lagged
dependent variables should be included in the empirical model.
Despite its wide use in the literature, we believe that there are serious drawbacks to in-
cluding lags of the dependent variable in a model like (6) when the sample size for estimation
8In the context of Okun’s Law-type analyses, a parameter like β∗ is known as dynamic beta; for details
on dynamic betas see, International Monetary Fund (2010).
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is not very large. In a time series setting, inclusion of lagged dependent variables violate key
exogeneity assumptions and make the OLS (ordinary least squares) estimates of the param-
eters inconsistent. Though the inclusion of lagged dependent variables can be justified in a
large sample setting, our focus on business cycle length time periods for estimation of the
model recommends that we avoid including lagged dependent variables. Often times, inclu-
sion of lagged dependent variables is justified as a mechanism for dealing with problems of
serial correlation in the errors; this is not necessary as heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors can be used to deal with problems of serial correlation of
errors without, at the same time, introducing the problems of inconsistent estimation that
comes with lagged dependent variables. Hence, the focus of our analysis will be on the model
without lagged dependent variables; we will allow for two lags of the independent variable
to capture dynamic effects. Hence, the model we estimate is
gEt = α + βg
Y
t + γ1g
Y
t−1 + γ2g
Y
t−2 + ut, (8)
with the contemporaneous Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient given by β and the long run Kaldor-
Verdoorn coefficient given by
β∗ = β + γ1 + γ2. (9)
Even in the model without lagged dependent variables, we need to address one important
specification issue: possible endogeneity of the growth rate of output in (8). Rowthorn
(1975b) and Skott (1999), as we have already seen, have pointed to the possibility of the
endogeneity of growth rate of output in a regression like (8) and have asserted that single-
equation estimation methods are thereby invalid. To address this issue, we report results from
two statistical tests of the endogeneity of the growth rate of output in (8): the HAC score
test (Wooldridge, 1995) and the C-statistic type test of endogeneity (Hayashi, 2000). The
idea behind both tests derives from Hausman (1978) and relies on comparing key statistics
that would be “close” to each other for cases with and without endogeneity of the relevant
regressor. The null hypothesis, in both cases, is that the relevant regressor – growth rate of
output, in our case – is exogenous and large p-values imply that the null cannot be rejected.
Table (6) and (5) in the Appendix report the p-values from these tests for the nine post-War
business cycles and the six major sectors that are studied in this paper.9 In an overwhelming
number of cases, the high p-value suggest that the null hypothesis – exogenous rate of growth
of output – cannot be rejected. This implies that estimating the parameters of (6) by OLS
gives reasonably accurate estimates of the “true” elasticities, both short run and long run, of
employment with respect to output. That the instruments used for the endogeneity tests are
indeed exogenous can be seen from the results reported in Table (7) in the Appendix which
reports p-values from Hansen’s overidentification test; for this test, the null hypothesis is
that the instruments are exogenous and thus large p-values imply that the null cannot be
rejected at standard levels of statistical significance.
9This analysis uses quarterly data; for details of the construction of the data set, see the Appendix.
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4.3 Evolution of Relationship over Time
Our main interest is not in studying the relationship between output and employment over
the whole post-war period, but in investigating how that relationship has changed over time.
To do so, we estimate the model in (6) without lagged dependent variables for each post-War
business cycle (peak-to-peak).10 In essence, thus, these are variable width rolling regressions
with business cycle window lengths.
These regressions give us the short run and long run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient, which
are then plotted across time to inspect the changing pattern of the response of employment
to output growth. Data for these rolling regression plots come from the BEA (for aggregate
output) and the BLS (for employment). Aggregate output is proxied by national income
at the industry level; this data is available at a quarterly frequency from NIPA Tables 6.1
B, C and D of the BEA. Nominal national income has been deflated by the GDP deflator
to arrive at a measure of real output. Nonfarm employment data at the industry level is
available at a monthly frequency from Table B1 of the BLS; this data is converted into a
quarterly frequency by averaging monthly data for relevant months in a quarter. Thus, the
data set for the rolling regression plots run from 1948Q1 to 2010Q2.11
Figure 2 and 3 plot the short run and long run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient over each
post-War business cycle. The first row of Figure 2 and 3 give plots for the whole economy,
and the non-financial value-adding sector of the economy12; the second row covers the whole
private services-producing industries and FIRE (the largest component of the services sec-
tor); the last row displays elasticities for the whole private goods-producing industries and
construction. Three striking trends emerge from Figure 2 and 3.
First, for the whole economy and the NFVA sector of the economy, there has been a sharp
fall in both the short run and the long run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient; there is a discernible
downward trend in the first rows of Figure 2 and 3. The short run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient
has fallen from about 0.4 to around 0.1; the long run coefficient has declined from the region
of 0.8 to around 0.3. Both figures display decade long (or longer period) fluctuations around
the downward trend. The downward trend for the long run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient is
especially pronounced since the mid-1980s.
Second, the private services-producing industries taken together do not display any de-
clining trend for the whole post war period. FIRE, the largest component of the private
10The short peak-to-peak cycle between 1980Q1 and 1981Q3 is ignored; instead, the whole period from
1980Q1 and 1990Q3 is considered one peak-to-peak cycle giving us a total of nine cycles.
11In deciding on the data source to use for the analysis in this paper we faced a trade-off between level
of disaggregation and frequency. The AIA data is available at the 1 and 2 digit level of NAICS but at an
annual frequency; the BEA national income data is available at a quarterly frequency but does not report
values for all the NAICS codes. For the regression analysis we chose the quarterly frequency data set and
sacrificed some disaggregation.
12The non-financial value-adding sector (NFVA), in this section and the next, is composed of the private
goods-producing industries (mining, construction and manufacturing) and the private services-producing
sector less finance, insurance & real estate. Thus, the NFVA in this sector is not identical to the MVA sector
of section 3. Lack of national income data at sufficiently disaggregated levels prevent us from making the
two definitions identical.
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Table 2: Testing for Decline in Elasticities
Post-War Period Neoliberal Period
SECTOR Short-Run Long-Run Short-Run Long-Run
ALL 4.16∗∗∗ 4.20∗∗∗ 2.71∗∗∗ 2.12∗∗
NFVA 2.43∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗ 1.86∗∗ 1.82∗∗
PGD 5.77∗∗∗ 4.61∗∗∗ 4.43∗∗∗ 3.15∗∗∗
CNS 3.41∗∗∗ 3.13∗∗∗ 5.09∗∗∗ 2.08∗∗
PSV 1.30 2.77∗∗∗ 1.37 1.36
FIR -1.23 -0.89 0.66 2.93∗∗∗
a The null hypothesis is that the estimates of Kaldor-Verdoorn
coefficient is same between the business cycles at the two ends of the
period under consideration; the (one-sided) alternative is that the
coefficient is larger in the initial period. The entries in the table are
the values of the test statistic in (10); a large positive value of the test
statistic is evidence against the null. Significance levels: ∗∗∗: 1
percent; ∗∗: 5 percent.
services-producing sector, has always had a numerically small (i.e., close to zero) short run
Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient; there is no observable trend in the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient
for FIRE. The long run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient, on the other hand, does display a
significant downward trend from the early 1980s.
Third, the private goods-producing industries behave very differently from the services-
producing industries. The private goods-producing industries as a whole display a significant
downward trend in both the short run and long run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient over the
whole post war period. Though there is an upward trend in the early 1970s, that gets quickly
reversed and there is a pronounced decline since the mid-1970s. Manufacturing, the largest
component of the private goods-producing industries, displays the same trend – though we
do not include the manufacturing sector in Figure 2 and 3 – and drives the result for the
whole goods-producing sector.
While visual inspection of trends in Figures 2 and 3 show significant declines in the
values of both the short run and the long run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient for the whole
economy and for most sub-sectors, Table 2 brings statistical evidence to bear on the issue of
decline. After all, the decline that is discerned by visual inspection might not be statistically
significant; it might be driven by pure sampling error. In Table (2), we report results of
testing the null hypothesis that the elasticities – both short run and long run – are the same
between the business cycles at the two ends of the period under consideration.
Suppose we wish to compare the elasticities between two business cycles, indexed by
i = 1, 2. Let βˆ1 and βˆ2 be the OLS estimators for the true Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient β1 and
β2 respectively in the two business cycles respectively. Let s
2
1 and s
2
2 be the heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimators of the variance σ21 and σ
2
2, respectively, of
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the OLS estimators βˆ1 and βˆ2. Then, the test statistic
t =
(βˆ1 − βˆ2)√
s21 + s
2
1
(10)
is distributed asymptotically as a standard normal random variable under the null
H0 : β1 = β2.
The first two columns report the test statistic for testing the null that the short run and
the long run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient is same for the following two peak-to-peak business
cycles: 1948Q4–1953Q2, and 2001Q1–2007Q4 (i.e., the whole post-war period); the next
two columns report the test statistic for comparisons between the following two peak-to-
peak business cycles: 1973Q4-1980Q1 and 2001Q1–2007Q4 (i.e., the neoliberal period). The
alternative hypothesis is that the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient in the initial period is higher
than that in the final period; hence, a positive and large value of the test statistic reported
in Table 2 is strong evidence against the null of no change in the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient
over time.
Two interesting facts that emerge from Table 2. First, the services-producing industries
(PSV) and its largest component, finance, insurance and real estate (FIR), either fail to
reject the null hypothesis or reject it in a much weaker fashion than the other sectors. This
seems to suggest that the growing strength of the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect has been much
more prominent in the non-services part of the economy. Second, the rejection of the null
hypothesis is weaker in the neoliberal period than for the whole post-war period. This
is because the declining trend in the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient was arrested and even
significantly reversed for about a decade long period before the onset of neoliberalism.
4.4 Decomposition of Kaldor-Verdoorn Effect
Suppose the economy is composed of two sectors, A and B. For instance, A could refer to
the goods-producing industries (PGD) and B could refer to the services-producing industries
(PSV); or, A could refer to the value-adding sectors (NFVA) and B could refer to the non-
value-adding sectors (i.e., the aggregate economy less NFVA). Let subscripts Y and E refer
to output and employment and superscripts A and B refer to the two sectors that make
up the aggregate economy. Thus, gY , g
A
Y and g
B
Y refers to the growth rate of output in the
aggregate economy and the two sectors respectively; similarly, gE refers to the growth rate of
employment in the aggregate economy, gAE and g
B
E refers to the growth rates of employment
in sectors A and B respectively. If SAE refers to the share of sector A in total employment,
then
gE = S
A
Eg
A
E + (1− SAE)gBE ;
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Figure 2: Short Run Kaldor-Verdoorn Coefficient over Business Cycles (peak-to-peak)
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Figure 3: Long Run Kaldor-Verdoorn Coefficient (without lagged dependent variable) over Busi-
ness Cycles (peak-to-peak)
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differentiating the above expression w.r.t. gY (the growth rate of aggregate output), we get
β =
dgE
dgY
=SAEβ
Adg
A
Y
dgY
+ (1− SAE)βB
dgBY
dgY
+ (gAE − gBE )
dSAE
dgY
≈SAEβA
∆gAY
∆gY
+ (1− SAE)βB
∆gBY
∆gY
+ (gAE − gBE )
∆SAE
∆gY
,
where β is the marginal effect of output growth on employment growth for the whole econ-
omy, and βA and βB are the marginal effects of output growth on employment growth for
sector A and B respectively. Note that the last step gives us an approximation because we
replace differentials (i.e., instantaneous change) with differences (i.e., change over a finite
time period).
Thus, if βˆ, βˆA and βˆB are consistent estimators of β, βA and βB for some time period,
then we have the following decomposition of βˆ in terms of the relative shares of the two
sectors in total employment SAE , the relative growth rates of output in the two sectors,
∆gAY /∆gY , and estimates of the marginal effects of output growth on employment growth
βˆA and βˆB in the two sectors:
βˆ ≈ βˆA(SAE
∆gAY
∆gY
) + βˆB(1− SAE)
∆gBY
∆gY
+ (gAE − gBE )
∆SAE
∆gY
. (11)
For a period when the relative employment shares in the two sectors remain unchanged, the
last term in (11) drops out and we have
βˆCSE ≈ βˆA(SAE
∆gAY
∆gY
) + βˆB(1− SAE)
∆gBY
∆gY
, (12)
where βˆCSE gives the value of the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient that would have approximately
arisen under a constant share of employment (hence the subscript CSE). Table 3 and 4 give
values of βˆ and βˆCSE, i.e., both short run and long run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficients, for
two different sectoral decompositions. In Table 3, the total private sector is broken up
into goods-producing and services-producing industries; in Table 4, the total private sector
is decomposed between a value-adding sector (NFVA) and a value-using sector (PVT less
NFVA). In Table 3 and 4 comparison of columns (1) and (2) for the short run Kaldor-
Verdoorn coefficient, and comparison of columns (3) and (4) for the long run coefficient
shows that the value of both coefficients fall over the post-War period even when share
of employment remains unchanged between goods and services-producing industries, and
between NFVA and non-NFVA.
This decomposition, therefore, highlights the important fact that the fall in the Kaldor-
Verdoorn coefficient for broad aggregates of the U.S. economy reflects both the shift of value
added toward the service sector (which has a lower coefficient) and a fall in the coefficients
in the subsectors themselves.
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Table 3: Decomposition of Kaldor-Verdoorn Coefficients
(PGD and PSV)a
Contemporaneous Long Run
Cycle (1) (2) (3) (4)
1948Q4-1953Q2 0.41 0.31 0.73 0.67
1953Q2-1957Q3 0.26 0.25 0.74 0.71
1957Q3-1960Q3 0.45 0.34 0.80 0.90
1960Q3-1969Q4 0.20 0.18 0.65 0.85
1969Q4-1973Q4 0.27 -2.05 0.64 -2.28
1973Q4-1980Q1 0.35 0.50 0.80 0.97
1980Q1-1990Q3 0.37 0.27 0.66 0.52
1990Q3-2001Q1 0.21 0.06 0.61 0.19
2001Q1-2007Q4 0.11 0.08 0.42 0.31
a Columns 1 and 3 give the estimated Kaldor-Verdoorn
coefficient, i.e, βˆ in (8); columns 2 and 4 give the value of
the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient computed under the
assumption that the share of employment does not change
over the business cycle, i.e., βˆCSE in (12).
Table 4: Decomposition of Kaldor-Verdoorn Coefficients
(NFVA and PVT-less-NFVA)a
Contemporaneous Long Run
Cycle (1) (2) (3) (4)
1948Q4-1953Q2 0.41 0.40 0.73 0.69
1953Q2-1957Q3 0.26 0.25 0.74 0.70
1957Q3-1960Q3 0.45 0.50 0.80 0.86
1960Q3-1969Q4 0.20 0.13 0.65 0.40
1969Q4-1973Q4 0.27 0.35 0.64 0.77
1973Q4-1980Q1 0.35 0.30 0.80 0.70
1980Q1-1990Q3 0.37 0.33 0.66 0.60
1990Q3-2001Q1 0.21 0.71 0.61 2.24
2001Q1-2007Q4 0.11 0.19 0.42 0.50
a Columns 1 and 3 give the estimated Kaldor-Verdoorn
coffeicient, i.e, βˆ in (8); columns 2 and 4 give the value of
the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient computed under the
assumption that the share of employment does not change
over the business cycle, i.e., βˆCSE in (12).
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5 The Discrepancy in the Current Recession
With the results of this analysis at hand, we are now ready to return to one of the motivating
questions of this paper: the huge discrepancy between employment-output dynamics in the
current recession and what one would expect on the basis of past trends.
To highlight the discrepancy between actual and “predicted” employment changes, we
compute out-of-sample forecast for the average annual compound growth rate of employment
allowing for lagged effects of observed output growth rates and compare it to observed growth
rates of employment during the same period. To fix notations, suppose, starting in period
t, a downturn lasts for n quarters. Let gEt+k and gˆ
E
t+k denote the actual and forecast quarter-
over-quarter growth rate of employment between quarter t + k − 1 and t + k respectively,
where k = 0, 1, . . . , (n−1), and forecasting is done using model (8) with a data set extending
over the previous peak-to-peak business cycle.
The actual average annual compound growth rate of employment in the downturn, g¯E,
is given by
g¯E =
{
n
√
(1 + gEt ) . . . (1 + g
E
t+n−1)− 1
}
× 400;
on the other hand, the forecast average annual compound growth rate of employment in the
downturn, ˆ¯gE, is given by
ˆ¯gE =
{
n
√
(1 + gˆEt ) . . . (1 + gˆ
E
t+n−1)− 1
}
× 400. (13)
For instance, for computing the forecast peak-to-trough (average annual) employment growth
rate for the 1991 recession, the model in (8) is estimated with a data set that runs from
1980Q1 to 1990Q3. The estimated parameters are then used to compute forecast growth
rates for each of the quarters in the recession using (8). The forecast average annual growth
rate of employment is then computed with the help of (13). Figure 4 plots g¯E and ˆ¯gE for all
the post-war downturns for the 6 industry grouping under investigation.
The comparison of the recovery period between actual and forecast employment growth
is carried out in a similar manner. Since data is available for the current recovery for only a
5 quarter period after the trough in 2009Q2, we have chosen to focus on a 5 quarter period
after each trough to compare the forecast and actual growth rates of employment during the
recovery period. For a four quarter recovery after the trough starting in period t, the actual
average annual compound growth rate of employment during the recovery, g˜E, is given by
g˜E =
{
5
√
(1 + gEt )(1 + g
E
t+1)(1 + g
E
t+2)(1 + g
E
t+3)(1 + g
E
t+4)− 1
}
× 400;
on the other hand, the forecast average annual compound growth rate of employment in the
recovery period, ˆ˜gE, is given by
ˆ˜gE =
{
5
√
(1 + gˆEt )(1 + gˆ
E
t+1)(1 + gˆ
E
t+2)(1 + gˆ
E
t+3)(1 + gˆ
E
t+4)− 1
}
× 400. (14)
23
For instance, for computing the forecast trough-to-recovery (average annual) employment
growth rate for the 1991 recession, the model in (8) is estimated again with a data set that
runs from 1980Q1 to 1990Q3. The estimated parameters are then used to compute forecast
growth rates for each of the 5 quarters in the recovery using (8). The forecast average annual
growth rate of employment is then computed with the help of (14). Figure 5 plots g˜E and
ˆ˜gE for all the post-war downturns for the 6 sectors under investigation.
The most striking trend emerging from Figure 4 and 5 is the aggregate evidence of a
structural break in the relationship between employment and aggregate demand sometime
during the 1980s (beginning of the neoliberal period), especially during the recovery phase
of busniess cycles. The first chart in the first row in Figure 5 (whole economy) shows that
for all recoveries prior to the double-dip recession in 1980, predicted and actual employment
changes in the 5 post-trough quarters moved in the same direction; both were positive though
different in magnitude. During the 1982 recovery, this trend was reversed for the first time:
while predicted employment change was positive, actual employment change was negative.
In the next three recessions, this trend reversal has continued unabated.
6 Explanations
The evidence we have presented here suggests that the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect has become
significantly stronger in the U.S. economy in recent decades, and that this fact is one of the
factors at the root of the changing connection between measured real output and employ-
ment. This raises the question of explanations for these structural changes.
Three possible explanations are: a shift in the U.S. labor market to a greater reliance
on temporary workers (flexible labor); the fact that, as Kaldor noted, “real output” in
service-producing sectors is not independently measured from income in those sectors, so
that some observed increases in real output are illusory (mis-measurement of real output);
and globalization, which leads to restructuring of production so as to shift low-value-added
employment from the U.S. to lower-wage regions of the world (global restructuring). We
discuss each of these possibilities in the light of the evidence we have presented.
6.1 Flexible Labor
One of the major explanations offered in the mainstream literature for the discrepancy
between actual and predicted employment changes that is often construed as a “breakdown”
of Okun’s Law, is what might be called the “flexibilization of labor” (for instance captured
by the increase in the share of temporary workers in the workforce) across industries. This
argument was used by Groshen and Potter (2003) to explain the jobless recovery after the
2000 recession in the U.S.; a broader but similar argument has been made in the 2010 World
Economic Outlook of the IMF using a cross-country framework (IMF, 2010).
This argument is straightforward. When the labor regime becomes more flexible and
unionization rates go down, firms cut down on the permanent workforce and replace them
with temporary workers. When there is an increase in demand during business cycle upturns,
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of Kaldor-Verdoorn Coefficients Against Share of Temporary Workers for
54 U.S. Private Industries, 1998-08
firms hire temporary workers rapidly and in a slump they shed most of their temporary
workforce. Thus, job losses are now “permanent” in nature as opposed to temporary layoffs
of permanent workers, i.e., job losses lead to permanent severing of employer-employee ties
rather than temporary severing of employer-employee ties with the implicit assumption of
a resumption of the relationship after the economic storm is weathered. In the context of
technological change and globalization of production (i.e., relocation and outsourcing), the
increase in the share of the temporary workforce increases the possibilities of “structural
change” (i.e., permanent shift of jobs across sectors, industries, regions and even countries).
When demand does revive during the upswing of the business cycle, the hiring process is
much more subdued because some of the jobs are simply not there anymore and creating
new jobs takes more time in the face of increased uncertainty. Hence, recoveries are jobless.
There is certainly a ring of plausibility to this argument; the idea of flexibilization of
labor seems to fit in with the general neoliberal turn since the late 1970s. But we don’t
think this argument captures the whole story. Even though the increasing flexibilization of
the workforce can probably explain the tepid job growth during recoveries, it is not clear
whether this effect remains in effect over the whole business cycle. If flexibilization increases
the ease of the hiring and firing process, the subdued employment response of output growth
during the recovery phase might come together with increased responsiveness during the
downturn (when the temporary workforce is rapidly shed) and the advanced phase of the
upturn (when temporary workers are rapidly hired to meet the growing demand). It is,
therefore, possible that when we look at the whole business cycle, the effect of flexibilization
on the relationship between output growth and employment washes out or is even reversed.
A careful reading of the evidence, in fact, suggests both cross-sectional and time series
problems with the “flexible labor” explanation for the diminished employment response of
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output growth.
The flexibilization explanation would predict that over the past few decades, as the share
of temporary workers has increased in the workforce, labor laws have been diluted and
unionization has fallen, the response of employment growth to output growth must have
increased. With the increasing ease of the hiring-firing process, the response of employment
to output changes would presumably go up over the business cycles (other than during the
initial phase of recoveries). The time series evidence presented in the variable window rolling
regression plots, for instance in Figure 3, seem to suggest exactly the opposite: the partial
effect of output growth on employment growth has fallen over the last few decades.
We carried out a simple exercise to test the cross-sectional validity of the flexibilization
argument for the U.S. Using AIA data from the BEA, we computed the short run and long
run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient for the 54 industries with 3 (or 4) digit NAICS code over
the period 1998-2008. For this period, the BEA also gives data on total (permanent and
temporary) and full-time (permanent) workers at the industry level. This allowed us to
compute the average share of temporary workers across industries during the same period.13
Figure 6 gives scatter plots of the short run and the long run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient
against the average share of temporary workers for the 54 industries with 3 (or 4) digit
NAICS code. A regression line is included in each figure, the left figure for short run and
the right figure for long run coefficient. The slope of the regression line for the short run
Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient scatter plot is negative (−1.303) but statistically insignificantly
different from zero (standard error = 1.374); the R2 for the regression is small at 0.017. On
the other hand, the slope of the regression line for the long run Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient
scatter plot is negative (−4.394) and statistically significant (standard error = 1.968); the
R2 for this regression becomes larger to 0.087. Thus, in a simple cross-sectional regression
framework, the variation in the share of temporary workers in the workforce across industries
either does not explain much of the variation in the Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient or has a
negative impact on it (in line with the time series evidence and against the ”flexibilization”
hypothesis).
We are thus led to conclude that neither the time series nor the cross-sectional evidence
supports growing labor flexibility as an adequate explanation of the changing relationship
between output and employment observed in the U.S. economy over the past few decades.
6.2 Measurement of Real Output
The evidence reviewed in the previous sections seems to suggest that the growing weight of
the services sector, especially the financial sector, is an important part of the explanation for
the weakening of the real GDP-employment relationship in the U.S. economy over the last
three business cycles. The growing weight of the financial sector systematically leads to real
GDP overestimating real output at the aggregate level which explains part of the apparent
breakdown of Okun’s Law.
13The AIA data of the BEA does not give the break-up of employment into temporary and permanent
workers before 1998; hence, we had to limit our cross-sectional analysis to the period 1998-2008.
28
The treatment of services in general, and particularly financial services in the national
income accounts, presents several issues. From a Marxian point of view, the incomes of
financial capital are transfers of surplus value created in production, and the labor and capital
employed in the financial sector are “unproductive” deductions from surplus value. The U.S.
national income accounts, however, treat incomes generated in the financial sector as arising
from the production of a fictitious imputed output, “financial services”, the value of which
is measured by the incomes generated in the sector. Thus when a computer manufacturer
pays bonuses to its executives, the payments have no impact on measured value added in the
sector; they shift income from residual profits to compensation of employees. On the other
hand, when a financial institution pays bonuses to its employees, measured value added in
the sector increases.
The difference in growth rates between the value-adding sectors and non-value-adding
sectors of the U.S. economy we have reported above indicates a significant and growing long-
run discrepancy between national income measures of real output and what we have called
measureable value added (see Table 1 for details). This discrepancy appears to have an
important and growing component at business cycle frequencies, though the small number
of cycles available does not permit a formal test of this hypothesis. Although the anemic
rise in U.S. GDP over the 5 quarters up to 2010Q3 is not concentrated solely in the financial
sector, but spread out over both value-adding and non-value-adding sectors, the downturn
was larger and the recovery weaker as measured by MVA.
Since a very large proportion of the increase in U.S. national income over recent decades
has occurred in the financial sector, there is a longer-run question as to how the U.S. economy
can sustain historical rates of growth of real incomes if value-adding production continues
to decline.
There is also evidence that the treatment of imported inputs in the NIPA accounts may
bias the measurement of real GDP upward (Houseman et al, 2010). The “double-deflation”
method used by BEA to estimate value added leads to an overestimation of the price indexes
that are used to deflate intermediate goods in a context where more and more of intermediate
goods come from the low-cost periphery of the global capitalist system, and hence to raise
measured real value added. The quantitative significance of this effect over the business
cycle remains to be investigated. We have controlled for this effect in the present paper
by calculating real GDP and real MVA as nominal value-added deflated by GDP deflators,
rather than using the BEA’s estimates of real GDP calculated through the double-deflation
method.
6.3 Global Restructuring
The fall in the partial effect of output growth on employment growth we document here
also must reflect to some degree the global restructuring of production (as described in
detail in Milberg and Winkler, 2009). Investment in the U.S. economy in recent decades
has increasingly taken the paradoxical form of the abandonment of U.S.-located productive
facilities as parts of the value-added chain have moved to lower-wage and hence lower-cost
locations. This type of investment costs money, since the relocation of production incurs
29
costs both in closing down U.S. facilities and adapting those parts of the production process
that remain in the U.S. to changing geographical patterns of supply. If the parts of the value-
adding chain that are relocated have lower value-added per worker than average, the effect
of this relocation will be an apparent increase in the productivity of the U.S. labor in the
jobs that remain. Thus globalization will intensify the Kaldor-Verdoorn effects, not through
the traditional channels of learning-by-doing and induced technical change, but through the
transfer of low-productivity jobs to low-wage regions of the world.
The dynamic of this restructuring has not been altered by the financial crisis of 2007− 8
and the consequent business cycle downturn. If anything, these tendencies may be intensified
in business cycle “recoveries”, when it is relatively easy for U.S. firms to respond to increases
in demand by more rapid shifts of production to lower-cost locations.
At the level of individual firms, globalization much like classic Marx-biased technical
change. The firm protects its ability to appropriate surplus value by investing to reduce
costs. There are, however, two significant differences. First, in the “trajectory a la Marx”
identified by Dume´nil and Le´vy (1995) real wages grow in proportion to value added, leaving
the rate of exploitation roughly constant, but with globalization real wages in the U.S.
stagnate, and the measured rate of exploitation rises. Second, the overall impact of the
classic Marx-biased technical change trajectory is an increase in the productivity of labor
in the advanced economies located at the technological frontier, but with globalization the
increases in profitability of firms arising from cost-reduction may not increase frontier labor
productivity.
A full assessment of the quantitative impact of globalization would require an examination
of the evolving structure of the U.S. economy in the context of the world capitalist economy.
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7 Appendix
The analysis in this paper uses industry-level data at two different frequencies, annual and
quarterly. In this appendix, we provide details of the sources of data and construction of the
relevant variables and industry groupings. In the last section of this Appendix, we report
results of endogenity tests of (8) in Table 5 and 6; Table 7 gives p-values of tests of exogeneity
of the instruments used for the tests in Table 5 and 6.
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7.1 Annual Data
The source of the annual data is the Annual Industry Accounts (AIA) of the BEA which
provides GDP-by-Industry data for the US economy for the period 1947 to 2009. The BEA
has converted the historical industry-level time series from the SIC to the NAICS; hence,
the AIA now provides a consistent industry-level data series running all the way back to
1947. We extract two variables from this data series: (1) nominal gross value added, and (2)
total employment. Nominal gross value added is defined as gross output (i.e., total sales or
receipts and other operating income) less cost of intermediate inputs (energy, material and
purchased services); the nominal gross value added figure is deflated by the aggregate GDP
deflator (from NIPA Table 1.1.4) to arrive at real gross value added. Total employment is
defined in the AIA as the total number of persons employed which includes both permanent
and temporary workers. We use real gross value added as a measure of output and the total
of permanent and temporary workers as a measure of employment, at the industry level, for
our analysis.
We use the following industry-level groupings for the annual analysis: ALL (the whole
economy), PVT (the total private industries sector), PGD (the private goods-producing
industries), PSV (the private services-producing industries), MVA (the measureable value-
adding industries, which includes agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, utilities,
transportation, information services, and arts & entertainment), CNS (construction), MFG
(manufacturing), WTD (wholesale trade), RTD (retail trade), TWR (transportation and
warehousing), INF (information services) FIR (finance, insurance and real estate), PBS
(professional and business services), EHS (education and health services), ART (art, enter-
tainment, accommodation and food services), OTH (other services excluding government).
7.2 Quarterly Data
We use two sources to construct our quarterly dataset, national income for major industry
groupings from NIPA Table 6.1 B, C and D of the BEA and employment data from the BLS.
Since, to the best of our knowledge, the BEA does not provide GDP-by-Industry data at a
quarterly frequency, we turned to NIPA Table 6.1 to construct a proxy for this. NIPA Table
6.1 B, C and D provides nominal national income type data for major industry groupings.
Since gross domestic product is the sum of national income, indirect business taxes and
depreciation (capital consumption allowances), national income for major industry groupings
can be used as a proxy for net value added. We use the real national income, i.e., national
income deflated by the GDP deflator as a measure of output at the industry level for our
analysis at a quarterly frequency.
Major revisions of industry classifications by the BEA might raise compatibility issues
in the use of time series of national income data at disaggregated levels. For instance, the
national income-type data in NIPA Table 6.1 till 1986Q4 uses the 1972 SIC; the data from
1987Q1 to 2000Q4 uses the 1987 SIC; and the data from 2001Q1 onwards uses the 2002
NAICS. The increase in the national income for the services-producing industries between
1986Q4 and 1987Q1 or between 2000Q4 and 2001Q1 seems to be arising partly from the
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re-classification exercise whereby some industries are moved from the goods-producing to
the services-producing categories. Thus, a part of the increase in the reported value-added
by services-producing industries would increase because of re-classification and not because
of real increase in produced output. Though this might, in general, bias the estimates of the
Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficient for the services-producing industries, our results would probably
not be overly affected because we compare whole business cycles and not particular years.
Moreover, among the nine peak-to-peak business cycles that we analyze only one, the 1980–
1990 cycle, straddles reclassification years.
Employment data has relatively fewer problems; it is taken from Table B-1 of the BLS
which gives the total number of employees on the payroll at the industry level at a monthly
frequency. A quarterly series is constructed by averaging employment figures for the months
in a quarter. This is then used as a measure of employment for the analysis at a quarterly
frequency.
We use the following six industry groupings for the quarterly analysis: ALL (the whole
economy), NFVA (the nonfinancial value adding sector, i.e., the total private sector less
FIRE), PGD (the private goods-producing industries, i.e., agriculture, mining, construction
and manufacturing), CNS (construction), PSV (the private services-producing industries,
i.e., the total private sector less the goods-producing industries), and FIR (finance, insurance
and real estate).
7.3 Tests of Endogeneity
Here we report results from two statistical tests of the endogeneity of growth rate of output
in (8): the HAC score test (Wooldridge, 1995) and the C-statistic type test of endogeneity
(Hayashi, 2000). The idea behind both tests derives from Hausman’s (1978) original work
and relies on comparing key statistics that would be “close” to each other for cases with and
without endogeneity of the relevant regressor. The null hypothesis, in both cases, is that
the relevant regressor – growth rate of output, in our case – is exogenous and large p-values
imply that the null cannot be rejected. Table 6 and 5 report the p-values from these tests for
the nine post-War business cycles and the six major sectors that are studied in this paper
using quarterly data. In an overwhelming number of cases, the reported p-value are high and
suggest that the null hypothesis – exogenous rate of growth of output – cannot be rejected
(small p-values are highlighted in red). This implies that estimating the parameters of (6)
by OLS gives reasonably accurate estimates of the “true” Kaldor-Verdoorn coefficients, both
short run and long run. That the instruments used for the endogeneity tests are indeed
exogenous can be seen from the results reported in Table 7 which reports p-values from
Hansen’s overidentification test; the null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous
and thus large p-values imply that the null cannot be rejected at standard levels of statistical
significance. In Table 5 and 6, we present p-values for tests of endogeneity in (8).
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Table 5: HAC Score Test of Endogeneity
Business Cycle
(Peak-to-Peak) ALL NFVA PGD CNS PSV FIR
1948Q4-1953Q2 0.1962 0.2563 0.3372 0.4645 0.2038 0.0660
1953Q2-1957Q3 0.1409 0.0953 0.1663 0.1651 0.0616 0.1280
1957Q3-1960Q2 0.1066 0.5492 0.8717 0.2414 0.0157 0.7931
1960Q2-1969Q4 0.3155 0.4291 0.2953 0.0500 0.2577 0.4333
1969Q4-1973Q4 0.8426 0.9925 0.2455 0.6148 0.4608 0.2155
1973Q4-1980Q1 0.2632 0.2003 0.0654 0.0742 0.2485 0.0592
1980Q1-1990Q3 0.5334 0.3330 0.0028 0.0078 0.5780 0.3272
1990Q3-2001Q1 0.3704 0.0862 0.1513 0.4598 0.1350 0.3255
2001Q1-2007Q4 0.6742 0.1934 0.8921 0.1031 0.1945 0.8212
a The null hypothesis is that the growth rate of output is exogenous in (8); the
statistic reported in this table is the p-value. The following three instruments are
used: aggregate consumption expenditure on goods, aggregate fixed investment,
total government expenditure. Details of the test are available in wooldridge
(1995); the test can be implemented in STATA using the postestimation
command estat endogenous option with ivregress.
Table 6: C-Statistic Type Test of Endogeneitya
Business Cycle
(Peak-to-Peak) ALL NFVA PGD CNS PSV FIR
1948Q4-1953Q2 0.3964 0.2393 0.2158 0.9203 0.4244 0.7232
1953Q2-1957Q3 0.8741 0.8706 0.9876 0.7813 0.3805 0.6080
1957Q3-1960Q2 0.4882 0.7446 0.9436 0.4874 0.5772 0.8487
1960Q2-1969Q4 0.4324 0.6520 0.2293 0.1602 0.3755 0.1945
1969Q4-1973Q4 0.9793 0.9145 0.9929 0.9030 0.2230 0.2925
1973Q4-1980Q1 0.3699 0.3703 0.6403 0.1431 0.6856 0.3796
1980Q1-1990Q3 0.6492 0.2987 0.0485 0.1262 0.9171 0.4983
1990Q3-2001Q1 0.5111 0.9229 0.8248 0.6148 0.9976 0.8685
2001Q1-2007Q4 0.6710 0.3740 0.6097 0.1748 0.3276 0.9821
a The null hypothesis is that the growth rate of output in (8) is exogenous; the
statistic reported in this table is the p-value. The following three instruments are
used: aggregate consumption expenditure on goods, aggregate fixed investment,
total government expenditure. Details of the test are available in Hayashi (2000);
the test can be implemented in STATA using the endog option with ivreg2.
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Table 7: Hansen’s Overidentification Test
Business Cycle
(Peak-to-Peak) ALL NFVA PGD CNS PSV FIR
1948Q4-1953Q2 0.6289 0.7398 0.8951 0.3486 0.5118 0.3965
1953Q2-1957Q3 0.4448 0.6458 0.6915 0.3991 0.6943 0.5844
1957Q3-1960Q2 0.9073 0.4501 0.4289 0.6483 0.4469 0.4771
1960Q2-1969Q4 0.7610 0.5542 0.9581 0.4721 0.5585 0.9026
1969Q4-1973Q4 0.3358 0.3321 0.3362 0.7299 0.9730 0.3774
1973Q4-1980Q1 0.4718 0.4203 0.3767 0.6689 0.4077 0.4645
1980Q1-1990Q3 0.1995 0.4375 0.7058 0.6198 0.2836 0.3570
1990Q3-2001Q1 0.2618 0.2589 0.1624 0.3297 0.2984 0.3135
2001Q1-2007Q4 0.5167 0.4102 0.4526 0.5859 0.4947 0.3516
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments used for the tests that are reported in
Table (5) and (6) - aggregate consumption expenditure on goods, aggregate fixed
investment, total government expenditure, and the lagged output growth rates -
are exogenous; the statistic reported in this table is the p-value associated with
the overidentification test. Details of the test are available in Hayashi (2000); the
test can be implemented in STATA using the postestimation command ivreg2.
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